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The Fascist Longings in Our Midst 
R E Y C H O W 
Evil is never done so thoroughly and so well as when it is done with a 
good conscience. _,. , . 
° BIAISE PASCAL, Thoughts (279) 
Fascism is not the prohibition of saying things, it is the obligation to say 
them. , . 
ROLAND BARTHES, Leçon (14) 
A. A S C I S M " is A B A N A L T E R M . It is used most often not simply to 
refer to the historical events that took place in Hider 's Germany 
and Mussolini 's Italy, but also to condemn attitudes or behaviour 
that we consider to be excessively autocratic or domineering. 1 
Speaking i n the mid-1970s, M iche l Foucault referred to the 
popularized use of the term "fascism" as "a general complicity i n 
the refusal to decipher what fascism really was." The non-analysis 
o f fascism, Foucault goes on, is "one of the important political 
facts of the past thirty years. It enables fascism to be used as a 
floating signifier, whose function is essentially that of denuncia-
t i on " ("Power and Strategies" 139). In this essay, I attempt to 
study this—what amounts to a col lect ive—"denunciat ion" of 
fascism by examining not only what is being denounced but also 
the major conceptual paths through which denunciat ion is pro-
duced. My argument is hence not exacdy one that avoids the 
"floatingness" of "fascism" by grounding it i n a particular time or 
space. Instead, I take fascism as a commonplace, in the many 
ways it is used to indicate what is deemed questionable and 
unacceptable. In the process, I highlight what I think is fascism's 
most significant but often neglected aspect—what I wi l l refer to 
as its technologized idealism. In my argument, fascism is not 
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simply the disguised or naturalized "ideology" that we find in 
Louis Althusser and Roland Barthes; 2 rather it is a term that 
indicates the product ion and consumption of a glossy surface 
image, a crude style, for purposes o f social identification even 
among intellectuals. In l ieu of a conclusion, I also comment on 
the affinities between fascism as a "large" historical force and the 
mundane events of academic life i n Nor th America in the 1990s 
by foregrounding the idealizing tendencies i n what is called 
multiculturalism. 
Monstrous Visions 
For those of us who do not have personal experience of the 
per iod of the Second World War in Europe and Asia, the picture 
that comes to m ind when we think of fascism is always a photo-
graph, a scene from a film, a documentary, or some graphic 
account narrated by survivors. The visual association we have 
with fascism is usually one of horror and destruction. Recentíy, 
for instance, I had the chance to view a video called "Magee's 
Testament" (produced and distributed by the Al l iance in Mem-
ory of the Victims of the Nank ing Massacre, 1991) about Ja-
pan's invasion of the city of Nanjing dur ing December 1937 to 
February 1938. These newsreel pictures of rape and massacre 
constitute the only known fi lmed document of the atrocities 
committed by Japanese soldiers dur ing what the Chinese call 
"Nanjing da tusha," the Nanjing Massacre or the Rape of Nanj-
ing. Shot by an American missionary, J o h n Magee, and recently 
re-discovered after fifty-five years, the cans of amateur film from 
the 1930S have been incorporated into a 30-minute video by the 
Chinese American filmmaker Peter Wang. Accord ing to Magee's 
account, about 300,000 Chinese were ki l led in a week. This 
number would be among the 15 to 20 mi l l i on generally esti-
mated to have been ki l led dur ing Japan's aggression against 
Ch ina from 1931 to 1945.3 
What comes across most powerfully i n "Magee's Testament" is 
the aesthetics o f Japanese brutality. I use the term aesthetics not 
in its narrow sense of principles of beauty or good taste, but i n 
the broader, Kantian sense of principles of perception and cog-
nit ion, principles that are i n turn manifested in outward be-
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haviour, as behavioural style. A m o n g the Chinese survivors in-
terviewed some forty-five years after the war, the memories of 
that aesthetics unfold in narratives that are juxtaposed with 
pictures taken in 1937 and 1938 of heart-rending wounds, 
amputations, disabilities, and deaths. I was struck most of all by 
the pictures of a still-living woman the back of whose neck had 
been sawed at with a bayonet. A large port ion of the head, which 
must have at one time been dangl ing in mid-air without being 
completely chopped off, was surgically stitched back onto this 
woman's body. A t the time the newsreel was made, it was as i f the 
camera, simply because it captured so vividly the painful physi-
cality of this event, was an accomplice to the original act of 
brutality. So was the doctor who manipulated the woman's head 
for the camera, and so were those watching the film. 
No words would do justice to the monstrosity of such an 
aesthetics. But what exactly is monstrous? N o doubt it is the 
calamitous destruction that descended upon the victims. A n d yet 
a monstrous aesthetics is also an aesthetics of making monstrous, 
of demonstrative magnification and amplif ication. As one writer 
points out, the Japanese soldiers who committed such acts of 
atrocity were able to do so because, like the Nazis, their loyalty to 
their ideology was so absolute that it freed them from all other 
restraints (Lestz 105). Un l ike the Nazis, who were Christians 
mindful of the close relations between "body" and "spirit," and 
who regarded physical involvement with their victims' bodies as a 
form of spiritual contamination, the Japanese showed no such 
compunction. The point about their fascism was not enthusiasm 
in discipline but enthusiasm in unharnessed cruelty. It was thus 
not enough simply to extinguish the enemy's life tout court; they 
must torture and mutilate in ways that pro long and aggravate 
their victims' suffering and thus maximize their own pleasure. 
There was no sense of being contaminated by the enemy because 
the enemy was just raw material into which they poked their 
swords, or discharged their urine and semen alike. 
L ike all graphic records of fascist destructiveness, the images 
of "Magee's Testament" clarify two things about fascism. The 
first, which is the easier to grasp, is that fascism is a form of 
technology. It is not simply that fascism deploys technological 
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means for its purposes; facism is also a k ind of demonstrative 
culture/writing whose magnitude—whose por tent—can only 
be that of the technological. The Japanese soldier d id not simply 
use technological weapons; he was a murder machine that hap-
pened to take the form of a man. The second thing about 
fascism, which is closely related to the first but not as readily 
acceptable, is that the most important sentiment involved in 
fascism is not a negative but a positive one: rather than hateful-
ness and destructiveness, fascism is about love and idealism. Most 
o f all it is a search for an idealized self-image through a heart-
felt surrender to something higher and more beautiful. L ike 
the Nazi officer who ki l led to purify his race, the Japanese sol-
dier raped and slaughtered in total devotion to his emperor and 
in the name of achieving the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere." L ike the Nazi concentration camp official who was 
genuinely capable of being moved to tears by a Beethoven sonata 
being played by Jewish prisoners, the Japanese officer, we may 
surmise, was probably also genuinely capable of being moved by 
the delicate feelings inscribed in cultured practices such as haiku 
poetry, calligraphy, or the tea ceremony. In each case, what 
sustains the aesthetics of monstrosity is something eminently 
positive and decent. 
Projection I: The Violence "In Us A l l " 
The question of the relationship between the destructive and 
idealizing sentiments in fascism is thus much more difficult than 
it first appears. Let us think, once again, of Foucault's criticism 
that we have used the term "fascism" only to denounce others. 
O n another occasion, i n the Preface to Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that the strategic adver-
sary combatted by Anti-Oedipus is fascism, adding that by this he 
means "not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hit ler and 
M u s s o l i n i . . . but also the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our 
everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to 
desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us" (xiii). 
By moving from events in the world outside back to the fascism 
" in us a l l , " Foucault suggests an ancient piece of philosophical 
advice: "Know thyself." A t the same time, by cal l ing attention to 
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the fascism " in us" as opposed to that outside us, Foucault 
articulates a specific conceptual mechanism used in many ac-
counts of fascism, the mechanism of projection as defined by 
Freud. The function of projection is described by Freud as a 
defence: when we sense something dangerous and threatening in 
ourselves, we expel and objectify it outward, so as to preserve our 
own stability. The best social example of Freud's understanding 
of projection is anti-Semitism. The "Jew" is the name and the 
picture of all those things we cannot admit about ourselves; it is 
thus a symptom of our fears and anxieties. 4 Even though it is not 
always consciously stated as such, Freudian projection is crucial 
to some of the most sophisticated accounts of fascism. 5 However, 
what emerges interestingly from Foucault's brief comments on 
fascism is that if the fascist discrimination against the "Jew" is a 
projection in Freud's sense, then our denunciatory use of the term "fas-
cism, " insofar as it remains a "floating signifier, " is also such a projec-
tion. "Fascism" has become for us the empty term, the lack, onto 
which we project all the unpleasant realities from which we want 
to distance ourselves. This is why fascism is associated alternately 
with colonialism, authoritarianism, mysticism, populism, social-
ism, banality, and so forth. 6 Ortega y Gasset summarizes fascism's 
emptiness perceptively when he writes that it is "simultaneously 
one thing and the contrary, A and not-A" (qtd. i n Laclau, 81-82). 
The extreme logical conclusion to this is that those who most 
violently denounce fascism—who characterize others as fas-
cists—may be themselves exhibit ing symptoms of fascism. 
But what is it that we "cannot" admit about "ourselves"? L ike 
many of his other concepts, Freud's definition of projection 
hinges on an act of negation: projection is the outward mani-
festation of a basic denial or refusal (of knowledge) in the 
individual organism. Once we focus on the indispensable nega-
tivity involved in projection, we notice that the premise for this 
projection is something like "human nature," which is treated as 
the source of the problems at hand. A critique of fascism by way 
of Freudian projection would hence always emphasize fascism as 
an expression of our own repress ion—our oppression of our-
selves—and most critics of fascism, it follows, see fascism first of 
all as an inner or internalized violence from which we need to be 
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"l iberated." The belief in repression and liberation as such has 
the effect of turning even the perpetrators of fascism—those 
who rape, mutilate, and slaughter—into victims who are ult i-
mately pardonable. For instance, in his classic study, The Mass 
Psychology of Fascism, Wi lhe lm Reich argues that fascism, like 
many forms of organized rel igion and mysticism, is the mass 
expression of orgiastic impotence or repressed sexual energies. 
Ci t ing Hit ler as his type case, Reich locates the social origin of 
fascism in the authoritarian patriarchal family, i n which feelings 
of fear and rebel l ion toward the father are combined with those 
of reverence and submission (37-40). Whi le Reich's interpreta-
t ion made up in a significant way for the neglect of sexuality that 
characterized most Marxist and economic approaches to fascism 
of his day, it nevertheless reads l ike a vulgarized use of Freud's 
not ion of repression: fascism becomes the compensatory "sub-
l imat ion" (in distorted form) of the energy that had nowhere 
else to go. Not surprisingly, therefore, the solution offered by 
Reich is finally that of "love" and "work"—the proper sublima-
tion of sexual energies that should, he writes, govern our lives. 
Similarly, i n Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari explain the 
repressive violence characteristic of Western society by way of 
Nietzsche's not ion of ressentiment. For them, ressentiment, which is 
active life force turned inward, has a name—Oed ipus . Freudian 
psychoanalysis, insofar as it helps perpetuate the ideological 
baggage of a metaphysics of interiority, is for Deleuze and Guat-
tari the place to begin criticism of the everyday fascism of West-
ern society.7 
The "internalized violence" model is so persuasive that it cap-
tures even a Marxist political philosopher like Ernesto Laclau. In 
Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, Laclau's project is that of 
finding ways to articulate the popular forces that motivated 
fascism in Europe. While Laclau does not fail to see the problems 
in Reich's interpretation (84-86), his own criticism of Nicos 
Poulantzas's well-known study of fascism is precisely that Poul-
antzas reduced every contradiction to a class contradiction and 
failed to take into account the processes of subjectivization in-
volved. Us ing Althusser's not ion of " interpellation," Laclau thus 
reformulates fascism as a k ind of popul ism that interpellated 
FASCIST LONGINGS 29 
masses as "a people" i n ways that went beyond their class distinc-
tions. It does not seem problematic to Laclau that Althusser's 
not ion of interpellation is still, arguably, dependent upon an 
outside (ideology) versus an inside (the individual) , and that the 
moment the individual responds to the hai l ing "Hey, you! " is also 
the moment when the force of ideology is "internalized." 
Despite the differences among these critics of fascism—De-
leuze and Guattari mock and deterritorialize Freudian psycho-
analysis while Reich, Althusser, and Laclau continue to adapt it to 
their own purposes—they al l impl ic idy agree that fascism's ef-
fectiveness has to do with its being a v i o l ence—a negative force— 
that has been "internalized," a violence that is somehow " in us" 
by nature or by culture. This leaves us with the question of how 
exactly fascism is " internalized." What does it mean for fascism 
to be " in us"? Do we violate ourselves the way the Nazis and 
the Japanese violated the Jews, the Gypsies, and the Asians? 
How does the lack " in us" (in Freud's terms, fear and denial) 
turn into a concrete thing "outside" us? How does the name-
less " i n us" acquire the external name 'Jew"? Conversely, how 
does that monstrous picture "out there" signify/become what is 
" in us"? How are we to understand that proclamation by Gor ing 
which epitomizes this basic problem of fascist projection—"I 
have no conscience. My conscience is Ado l f Hit ler"? (qtd. in 
Mitscherl ich, 288). 
In other words, when we move from acts of brutality to "inter-
nalized violence," or when we move from the lack that is sup-
posedly " in us" to external atrocities, some change, presupposed 
and yet unexplained, has taken place. This change, which is the 
unarticulated part of all of these theories of internalized vio-
lence, is metaphorical, imaginary, and, as I wil l argue, technologi-
cal. It indicates that which happens but which we cannot actually 
see or h e a r — a n d which we must therefore explain in terms other 
than itself. The filmic image, because it is obvious and palpable, 
offers a convenient way of staging these "other" terms. 
But there is a more fundamental reason why fascism can be 
explained by way of film. Not that film "expresses" the images of 
fascism effectively. Rather, l ike film, fascism as an ideology has 
"its foundation in projection." I take this phrase from Al ice 
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Yaeger Kaplan's i l luminating study of French fascism, Reproduc-
tions of Banality. Basing her not ion of fascism not on the pro-
found but on the banal and obvious (46), Kaplan calls for a 
different k ind of attention to be paid to fascism—not a convo-
luted search in the depths of our selves for the ressentiment 
imposed by rel igion or family, but attention to fascism as projec-
tion, surface phenomenon, everyday practice, which does away 
with the distinction between the " inside" and the "outside": ' The 
fascist ideal is being swallowed by the subject at the same time as 
it is being projected onto the leader. Projection and introjection 
are not always even that distinguishable" (6) . 8 The indistinguish-
ability of introjection from projection means that there is a 
mutual implication between fascism and technology, inc luding 
the technology that is psychoanalysis. When authors like Freud 
used terms such as "projection" and "screen memory," Kaplan 
writes, they were already speaking to the mediatized make-up of 
our experience (5). 
What is " internal ized"—if the language of internalization still 
makes sense—is thus not so much the atrocious ideology of 
cruelty as its monstrous, propagandist form: 
The crowd comes to know itself as film. Subjects knowing themselves 
as film—that is, internalizing the aesthetic criteria offered in film 
—have a radically different experience, than if they knew them-
selves through film. In the film experience the spectators do not 
merely control a model that remains exterior to their untouched 
subjectivity; rather, their subjectivity is altered and enlarged by the 
film. . . . (155) 
What is " internalized" in the age of film is the very projectional 
mechanism of projection. If individuals are, to use Althusser's 
term, "interpellated," they are interpellated not simply as watch-
ers of film but also as film itself. They "know" themselves not only 
as the subject, the audience, but as the object, ,the spectacle, the 
movie. In his study of the cinema of Fassbinder, Thomas Elsaes-
ser makes a similar argument about German fascism, namely, 
that German fascism was based on the state of being-looked-at, 
which cinema's proclivity toward visual relations conveniently 
exemplifies. Elsaesser holds that the Fassbinder trademark of 
exhibi t ionism—the persistent foregrounding of being-looked-at 
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and its significance for the formation of social ident i ty—should 
be understood in this light: 
What, Fassbinder seems to ask, was fascism for the German middle 
and working-class which supported Hider? We know what it was for 
Jews, for those actively persecuted by the regime, for the exiles. But 
for the apolitical Germans who stayed behind? Might not the pleas-
ure of fascism, its fascination have been less the sadism and brutality 
of SS officers than the pleasure of being seen, of placing oneself in 
view of the all-seeing eye of the State? Fascism in its Imaginary 
encouraged a moral exhibitionism, as it encouraged denunciation 
and mutual surveillance. Hider appealed to the Volk but always by 
picturing the German nation, standing there, observed by "the eye of 
the world." The massive specialization of public and private life... 
might it not have helped to institutionalize the structure of "to be is to 
be perceived" that Fassbinder's cinema problematizes? (545)9 
In Elsaesser's phrase "to be is to be perceived," we see that 
projection, instead of being preceded by "being," is itself the 
basis from which "being" arises. What this means is a reversal of 
Freud's model of projection. While Freud begins with the "be-
ing " that is the individual organism—the inner something that, 
sensing something unpleasant, projects it outward—Elsaesser's 
reading of Fassbinder enables us to begin instead with the projec-
tion that is obviously "out there"—the projection that is "being 
perceived," the projection that is film. While the Freudian model 
describes projection as being based upon an original lack, as an 
externalized concretization or objectification of that lack, we can 
now ask instead: how does the projection that is film "become" 
us? How does visual technology inhabit the human shape? 
In order to answer these questions, we need to recall the more 
conventional meaning of projection as an act o f thrusting or 
throwing forward, an act that causes an image to appear on a 
surface. Despite the suggestive association of fascism with film, 
what remains unarticulated in Kaplan's (and to some extent 
Elsaesser's) account is the difference between this obvious sense 
of projection and Freud's definition. Whi le the common concep-
tual path taken by most critics o f fascism is projection in Freud's 
sense—that is, projection as a subject's refusal to recognize 
something i n order to defend i tsel f—fi lm, as external image, 
operates with the more obvious sense of project ion—as objects 
already out there, objects that may not necessarily be a compen-
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sation or substitution for an original (subjective) lack or inability. 
Once the premise of projection is changed from "inside" to 
"surface" 
in this manner, it becomes possible to think of projection as 
a positing rather than a negating function. It would also, I pro-
pose, be possible to rethink fascism away from the projection-as-
compensated-lack model provided by Freud. 
Projection II: Angels of Light 
By turning to film and to the formal mutuality between film and 
fascism, I am not saying that film offers a means of illustrating the 
principles of fascism. What I am saying is that fascism cannot be 
understood without a certain understanding of the primacy of 
the image, which is best exemplified by the relations of receptivity 
involved in film. My point can be stated in a different way: film, 
because it is obviously imagistic, stands as a good way of analyzing 
the abstract problem of projection, which is also the problem of 
that imaginary and metaphoric change between external and 
internal violence that remains unexplained in the writers I men-
tioned earl ier. 1 0 
It is hence not an accident that critics of fascism frequently 
turn to film for their discussions. Consider, for instance, Susan 
Sontag's classic "Fascinating Fascism," from which the tide of 
the present essay is taken. 1 1 In her essay, Sontag repudiates 
the judgement that the work of fi lmmaker and photographer 
Len i Riefenstahl, who received generous support from the Ger-
man government for her productions dur ing the Nazi period, is 
nevertheless i n some significant manner "apolit ical." By refusing 
to separate artistic technique from ideology, Sontag persuasively 
shows how the creation of beauty in Riefenstahl's films is inti-
mately l inked to fascist ideals. Toward the end of the essay, 
Sontag writes: 
it is generally thought that National Socialism stands only for brutish-
ness and terror. But this is not true. National Socialism—or, more 
broadly, fascism—also stands for an ideal, and one that is also 
persistent today, under other banners: the ideal of life as art, the cult 
of beauty, the fetishism of courage, the dissolution of alienation in 
ecstatic feelings of community; the repudiation of the intellect; the 
family of man (under the parenthood of leaders). (43) 
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Insofar as she identifies the positive messages of fascism as an 
inalienable part of its functioning, I am in total agreement with 
Sontag. Her charge that the most widely appreciated qualities of 
Riefenstahl's work—its beauty, its technical ref inement—are 
precisely what speak most effectively to "the fascist longings i n 
our midst" is so perceptive that it is unsetding. 1 2 Yet peculiarly, in 
an essay that so clearly insists on the inseparability of art and 
ideology, Sontag nonetheless makes a distinction between art 
and ideology as soon as she tries to contrast fascist art with communist 
art: 
The tastes for the monumental and for mass obeisance to the hero 
are common to both fascist and communist art.. . . But fascist art has 
characteristics which show it to be, in part, a special variant of 
totalitarian art. The official art of countries like the Soviet Union and 
China is based on a Utopian morality. Fascist art displays a Utopian 
aesthetics—that of physical perfection.... In contrast to the asexual 
chasteness of official communist art, Nazi art is both prurient and 
idealizing. . . . The fascist ideal is to transform sexual energy into a 
"spiritual" force, for the benefit of the community. (40-41) 
If Sontag's judgement about fascist art does away with the distinc-
tion between propaganda and aesthetics, her reading of the 
difference between communist and fascist art reintroduces it. We 
can only speculate that, as a Jewish intellectual writing in the 
Uni ted States of the 1970s, Sontag was absolutely clear-eyed 
about the fascism of the earlier decades, but like all left-leaning 
Eurocentric intellectuals of that period, she retained a sense of 
i l lusion about communism. Hence even though she writes that 
fascist art shares with totalitarian art the same tastes for the 
monumental and for mass obeisance to the hero, she seems to 
imply, ultimately, that because fascism beautifies and thus hides 
its totalitarian motives i n aesthetically impeccable images, it is 
the more pernicious and dangerous of the two. Once ideology 
and art are distinguished as content and facade i n this way, 
however, "aesthetics" returns to the more narrow and conven-
tional sense of the beautiful alone. 
By describing fascism as fascinating "aesthetics" in the narrow 
sense, Sontag, in spite of her own insights, rejoins the tendency 
of most discussions of fascism, in which attention is almost always 
focused, negatively, on the "deceptiveness" of fascist authorities: 
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these fascists, it is thought, paint beautiful (that is, delusive) 
pictures about their ugly (that is, real) behaviour. Such pictures, 
in other words, have the status of deliberate lies. Fascist atrocities 
thus become the "real " that sets the records straight, that exposes 
the "deceit" and "error" of fascist rhetoric. 
But it is precisely i n this k ind of interpretive cross-over from 
rhetoric to deed, from "l ies" to " truth," from "beautiful pictures" 
to "ugly reality" that critics have downplayed the most vital point 
about fascism—its significance as image and surface, its projec-
tional idealism. The "false-true" dichotomization leads us to 
believe that good intentions cannot result i n cruel behaviour, 
and conversely, that the fact o f cruelty can only be the result o f 
hidden evil motives "dressed u p " as beautiful pictures. We see 
how the substitutive or compensatory logic of Freud's not ion of 
projection is fully at work here: the fascists, according to this 
logic, project what they (secretly) deny about themselves "out-
side"; we the critics thus have to negate their negation and 
rewind their projection from that false "outside" back into their 
hidden "inside." Accord ing to this logic, not only are intentions 
and behaviour transparently l inked; they are also l inked through 
opposition and negation: hence, the "good" image is an index 
to "bad" motives. But what i f the declared ideals were not 
lies (projection in Freud's sense) but projections (projection 
in the common sense of throwing forward)? How then do we 
understand the relation between noble intentions and atrocious 
deeds? 
Without the i l lusion about communism—that its propaganda, 
unl ike the beautiful facade of fascism, has after all some real 
connection to a "utopian moral i ty"—Sontag would in fact have 
come close to saying that the aesthetics o f fascism (aesthetics i n 
the broad sense of cognition and perception) resides precisely in 
images—not so much images-as-the-beautiful but images-as-the-
positivistic-and-self-evident. The "beautiful" images are not im-
ages that "h ide" (the content o f horror ) ; rather they are the 
cognitive form of the technological age, the surface or superficial 
phenomena that present themselves as evidence of themselves 
instead of some other, " inner " meaning. What is fascist about 
fascism's idealized images is not only that they are positive, but 
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also that they pose and posit, and are positivistic. This positivity is 
the "projection" that the followers of fascism "internalize." 
What Sontag correcdy identifies as the " ideal iz ing" tendencies 
of fascism can thus be explained by the projectional nature of 
film. To present something in " ideal ized" terms is literally to 
enlarge and embolden i t — i n short, to blow it up as a picture. 
Whi le it takes its materials from everyday life, this picture, by its 
very positivity, also becomes mythic. It holds a promise and turns 
the everyday into the primitive and archetypal. In the process of 
consuming it, we become infantilized. As Kaplan writes, "the 
machinery of the media gave birth to a new k ind of ideological 
vulnerability. It was mother bound " (23). In what amounts to the 
same argument, Kaplan also writes: "When fascism took power, it 
took charge of the imaginary" (34). 1 3 
André Bazin provides an astute analysis o f these relations 
between film and idealism, relations that are based on projec-
tion, i n an essay called ' The Stalin Myth in Soviet C inema." 
Un l ike Sontag, who still attributes to communist art a utopianism 
that would set it off from fascist art, Bazin calls attention precisely 
to the ideal iz ing—that is, fascistic—logic i n the Soviet films 
about Stalin. Writ ing around 1950, Bazin was amazed by the 
fact that these mythically positive images of Sta l in—as a hyper-
Napoleonic military genius, as an omniscient and infallible 
leader, but also as a friendly, avuncular helper to the common 
people—were made while the man was still alive. Bazin's point is 
that only the dead are larger than life: "If Stalin, even while 
l iving, could be the main character o f a film, it is because he is no 
longer 'human, ' engaging in the transcendence which charac-
terizes l iv ing gods and dead heroes" (36). The glorifying films 
have the effect of mummifying and monumental iz ing Stalin, so 
that it is the Stalin-image which becomes the ultimate authority, 
which even Stalin himself had to follow in order to "be" (40). 
According to Bazin, thus, the idealizing power of c inema is not 
only positivistic but also retroactive, cal l ing for a submission to that 
which has always, i n the process of being idealized, already 
become past or dead. The Stalin myth in Soviet c inema com-
mands an absolute surrender—an identification that is possible 
only with the cessation of history. Bazin illustrates the retroactive 
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logic of fascist idealization with another, non-filmic example, the 
Stalinist trials. For Bazin, the major accomplishment of the trials 
is their success in remaking, that is, falsifying, history with the 
pre-emptiveness of retroaction: 
According to the Soviet "Stalinist" communist perspective, no one 
can "become" a traitor. That would imply that he wasn't always a 
traitor, that there was a biographical beginning to this treason, and 
that, conversely, a person who became a menace to the Party would 
have been considered useful to the Party before becoming evil. The 
Party could not simply bust Radek to the lowest rank, or condemn 
him to death. It was necessary to proceed with a retroactive purge of 
History, proving that the accused was, since birth, a willful traitor 
whose every act was satanically camouflaged sabotage. Of course, this 
operation is highly improbable and far too serious to be used in every 
case. That is why the public mea culpa can be substituted concerning 
minor figures whose historical action is indirect—such as artists, 
philosophers, or scientists. These solemn hyperbolic mea culpas can 
seem psychologically improbable or intellectually superfluous to us if 
we fail to recognize their value as exorcism. As confession is indispen-
sable to divine absolution, so solemn retraction is indispensable to 
the reconquering of historical virginity. (37) 
By inserting this discussion of the logic of totalitarian interroga-
tion in an essay about cinematic representation, Bazin enables us 
to see retroaction as the crucial common ground for both the 
Stalinist trials and the filmic construction of Stalin. Moreover, he 
enables us to see that retroaction works hand in hand with 
positivism: like the interrogative erasure of the history o f com-
munist "traitors"—an erasure (of counter-evidence) that, in ef-
fect, becomes the self-validating "evidence" o f their gu i l t—the 
very (retroactive) idealization of Stalin's goodness in the form of 
(positivistic) images are part o f a manipulat ion of history that 
uses images as their own alibi by making them appear self-evident. 
The effect is mass sacrif ice—the sacrifice o f the masses' own 
knowledge of history i n submission to the mythic image. 
Bazin's analysis offers us a way out o f Freud's definition of 
projection. Instead of operating negatively as refusal, compen-
sated lack, and defense mechanism, projection here is the posi-
tive instrument of transparency, of good intentions shining forth 
in dazzling light. Stalin as the angel o f l i gh t—no t only i n the 
sense that he was br inging enlightenment to the people but also 
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in the sense that he was himself transparent, thus allowing for an 
identification that dissolves the boundary between the inside and 
the outside — this was the magic of his image. It is therefore not 
by focusing on the atrocious deeds, the "evi l" of fascists, but on 
their moments of idealism product ion, their good conscience, 
that we can understand the effectiveness of fascist aesthetics. The 
voice of Emperor Hirohi to , heard for the first time by his people 
over the radio after the bombing of H i rosh ima and Nagasaki, 
speaking solemnly o f the sadness of national defeat, was one 
example of this aesthetics. The voice and image of Mao Zedong 
tell ing the Red Guards that "Revolution is not cr iminal , revolt is 
reasonable" in the form of massive street slogans and pamphlets 
was another. The sincere altruistic rhetoric we hear i n U S presi-
dential campaigns, complete with the candidates' demonstra-
tions of their ordinariness (their love of family, for instance), is a 
third. In all of these cases, it is the force of light, transparency, 
and idealized image that works in the service of " interpellating" 
the masses, who receive the leaders as a mesmerizing film. To say 
that the leaders are " ly ing" to the masses would be to miss the 
point of our thoroughly mediatized feelings and perceptions, 
which accept this aesthetics without coercion, and which accept 
it as positive and good . 1 4 
That fascism is primari ly a product ion of l ight and luminosity 
is an argument Paul V i r i l i o makes, among other works, in War 
and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception. V ir i l io 's point over and over 
again is the fatal interdependence of the technologies of warfare 
and vision, "the conjunction between the power of the modern 
war machine . . . and the new technical performance of the 
observation machine" (71; emphases in the original). H ider and 
Mussol ini clearly understood the coterminous nature of percep-
tion and destruction, of cinematic vision and war. Whi le the 
former commented in 1938, "The masses need i l lus i on—but 
not only in theatres or cinemas," the latter declared, "Propa-
ganda is my best weapon" (qtd. i n V i r i l i o , 53). 
These remarks show us the technical nature of fascism, not 
only i n the sense that fascism deploys technological weapons, but 
also in the sense that the scale of il lusion/transparency promised 
by fascism is possible only i n the age of film, the gramophone, 
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and the loudspeaker. The mediatized image and vo ice—ma-
chines in human form rather than humans using machines— 
are, i n Heidegger's terms, fascism's tedine. V i r i l i o writes: 
If photography, according to its inventor Nicéphore Niepce, was 
simply a method of engraving with light, where bodies inscribed 
their traces by virtue of their own luminosity, nuclear weapons inher-
ited both the dark room of Niepce and Daguerre and the military 
searchlight. (81) 
To paraphrase V i r i l i o , we might add that fascism is an engrav-
ing with light on people's "minds": fascist leaders inscribed their 
traces by virtue of their own luminosity; fascist propaganda inher-
ited both the dark room of Niepce and Daguerre and the military 
searchlight. . . . 
The Story of O, or, the New Fascism 
In the foregoing pages, I have tried to argue that fascism needs to 
be understood not only i n its negative but more importandy in its 
positive aspects, and that fascism's production of idealism is a 
projectional production of luminosity-as-self-evidence. In an es-
say entitled "The Evidence of Experience," which does not at first 
seem to have anything to do with the topic of fascism, Joan Scott 
has made comparable observations about the use of "experi-
ence" in the Nor th American academy today. In the general 
atmosphere of a felt need to deconstruct universalist claims 
about human history, Scott writes, scholars of various disciplines 
have increasingly turned to personal experience as a means of 
such deconstruction. However, she argues, by privi leging experi-
ence as the critical weapon against universalisms, we are leaving 
open the question as to what authorizes experience itself. Scott 
charges that the appeal to experience "as uncontestable evi-
dence and as an originary point of explanation" for historical 
difference has increasingly replaced the necessary task of explor-
ing "how difference is established, how it operates, how and in 
what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act i n the wor ld . " 1 5 
For me, what is especially interesting is the manner in which 
Scott emphasizes the role of vision and visibility throughout her 
essay. Beginning her discussion with Samuel R. Delany's auto-
biographical meditation, The Motion of Light in Water, Scott notes 
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that "a metaphor of visibility as literal transparency is crucial to 
his project. " She concludes that for Delany, "Knowledge is gained 
through vision; vision is a direct apprehension of a world of 
transparent objects" (775). What Scott articulates here is the 
other side of Vir i l io 's argument about the coterminous nature of 
visual perception and destruct ion—that is, the coterminous na-
ture of visual perception and knowledge: "Seeing is the origin of 
knowing" (776). While the technology of seeing, or seeing-as-
technology, has become an inalienable part of the operation of 
militarism and fascist propaganda, Scott shows how it has also 
come to dominate our th inking about identity, so much so that 
visibility and luminosity are the conditions toward which ac-
counts of difference and alternative histories derived from "per-
sonal experience" now aspire. 
This k ind of aspiration, Scott implies, is an aspiration toward 
the self-evidence of the self s (personal) experience. The self as 
evidence: this means that the self, l ike the Stalin myth in Soviet 
cinema, is so transparent, so shone through with light, that it 
simply is, without need for further argument about its history or 
what Scott calls its "discursive character" (787). 
By alerting us to the technology (what she calls metaphor) of 
visibility, which is now engraved in the attitudes toward knowl-
edge, history, and identity, Scott's argument provides a way of 
l ink ing the "large" historical issues of fascism and totalitarianism 
we have been examining with the "smal l " sphere of Nor th Ameri -
can academic life in the 1990s. In the remainder of this essay, I 
wil l elaborate this linkage further with the help of a fictional 
scenario. As many readers wil l recognize, the features of this 
scenario are a composite drawn from the recent general trends 
of "mult icultural ism" in the academy. By portraying these fea-
tures in a deliberately exaggerated form, my point is not to slight 
the significance of the work that is being done by non-Western 
intellectuals on the non-Western world, but rather to deconstruct 
our increasingly fascistic intellectual environment, i n which fac-
ile attitudes, pretentious credentials, and irresponsible work hab-
its can be fostered i n the name of "cultural plural ism." The 
heroine in my fictional scenario is ultimately a mock heroine, the 
victim of a dangerous collective culture which all of us working in 
the West perpetrate in different ways. 
40 REY C H O W 
We wil l call this imaginary heroine O. A "person of co lour" 
from a " third wor ld" country, O is enrolled in a graduate pro-
gram in a Nor th American university. Despite her upper-class 
background, O tells people that she is from poor peasant stock in 
order 
to enhance her credibility as a "third-world" intellectual. After 
muddl ing and bluffing through her coursework, O launches a 
"multidiscipl inary" dissertation that deals with various types of 
social protest by underdogs in her culture of origin. For two or 
three years O does virtually nothing by way of serious reading 
and research, though she makes her presence known regularly 
by speaking extemporaneously at different conferences. M u c h 
as she holds "Western capitalism" in contempt and tirelessly 
brandishes slogans of solidarity with downtrodden classes in the 
" third world," O seems even more determined to get her share of 
fame, privilege, and material well-being in the "first wor ld " by 
hook or by crook. But even while O has no qualms about faking 
her way through graduate school, and even while no one can, 
when asked, say what her project really is apart from repeating 
the vague generalities that O habitually recites, the support O 
receives from well-established academics across the U.S. is tre-
mendous. Many of these supporters are white. Some of them 
assert that O is the most talented young intellectual from a " third 
wor ld " country they have ever encountered. With their glowing 
recommendations, O eventually finds herself a j ob teaching at a 
U S university. 
What is behind such sincere support of a great impostor from 
what are undoubtedly intelligent and accomplished people? A 
mass process similar to that described in the classic story of the 
Emperor 's new clothes is mobi l ized here, as someone wi l l ing to 
occupy the position of the Emperor accidentally appears. Obvi-
ously, we cannot say to O's supporters: "But can't you see . . . ? ! " — 
because another k ind of seeing is taking place. By seeing a 
student of colour, no matter how pretentious and fraudulent, as 
self-evidently correct and deserving of support, these supporters 
receive an image of themselves that is at once enlightenedly hum-
ble ("I submit to you, since you are a victim of our imperialism") 
and beautiful ("Look how decent I am by submitting to you"), 
and thus eminently gratifying. 
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Even though O may be cheating her way through the system, 
therefore, she alone is not to blame for this ridiculous situation. As I 
already emphasized, it is our flagrantly irresponsible environ-
ment o f "cultural p lura l ism" that nurtures her behaviour and 
allows her to thrive. 1 6 In the white l iberal enthusiasm for "peo-
ples of co lour" that is currently sweeping through North Ameri -
can academic circles, something of the fascism we witnessed in 
earlier decades has made its return in a new guise. The basis for 
this fascism is, once again, the identification with an idealized 
other placed in the position of unquestionable authority. Like 
the fascism of the 1920s and 1930s, a feeling of rebell ion is 
definitely present; l ike the o ld fascism also, there is a massive 
submission to a k ind of figure of "experience" that is assumed to 
be, to use the terms of Scott's analysis, luminously self-evident. 
This time, what is "rebel led" against is, fashionably, the canon of 
the West or "Western imperial ism," and the figure onto whom 
such feelings are projected is the "person of colour," regardless 
of that person's actual personal or professional pol i t ics. 1 7 
Once fascism starts taking effect, it is useless to point out that 
the person being put i n the position of the Emperor wearing new 
clothes is a fraud. Debunking O as an impostor by pointing out 
her fraudulence—that she is actually ignorant, lazy, and deceit-
ful, for instance—would be to miss the point that fascism hap-
pens when people willingly suspend disbelief in fraudulence and 
that, i n fact, it is precisely with such fraudulence that they iden-
tify. The trait-of-identification between O and her supporters is 
the glossy surface image of a righteous "person of colour" who, 
simply by being (herself), simply by making loud proclamations against 
the West at all times, brings justice to everyone who has suffered 
under Western imperial ism. Since the identification is precisely 
with this truth/il lusion about O — t h a t she simply is, without 
work or e f fort—debunking it would reinforce rather than de-
stroy O's appeal . 1 8 Fascism here is the force of an " in spite o f 
turning into a "precisely because": i n spite of the fact that the 
Emperor has no clothes on, people see h im as the opposite: 
precisely because he has no clothes on, people themselves provide 
the vision that makes up for this lack. In this vision, an impostor 
like O looms with irresistible charm, as an angel of light. For 
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those who love her with benevolence, O is a cipher, an autom-
aton performing the predictable notions of the " third wor ld " 
intellectual they desire. 
This "story of O " is but one among many that characterize the 
"politically correct" atmosphere of the Nor th American academy 
of the 1990s. In using the term "politically correct, " what I intend 
is not the k ind of conservative, rightwing bashing of how the 
academy has gone to hel l with feminism, cultural plural ism, 
multidisciplinarity, and their l ike, but rather the phrase's origi-
nal sense of a criticism of our own moral self-righteousness gone 
haywire. In this original sense, "polit ical correctness" is a machin-
ery o f surveillance that encourages certain kinds of exhibition-
ism. To borrow from Elsaesser's study of Fassbinder, we may say 
that "In the face of a bureaucratic surveillance system ever more 
ubiquitous," the O's o f the academy, like the German middle-
class citizens in Fassbinder's films, take on "an act of terrorist 
exhibitionism which turns the machinery of surveillance . . . into 
an occasion for self-display" (545). 
As a "person of co lour" from the " third world," as a student 
doing a project about lower classes in the " th ird wor ld, " O 
occupies a number of positions that are currently considered, 
i n an a priori manner, as "other" and "marginalized." But are 
such positions alone, especially when they are self-consciously 
adopted and promoted simply in order to draw attention and in 
place of hard work, a genuine contribution to change? Does 
"otherness" itself automatically suffice as critical intervention? By 
subscribing to the "evidence of experience" as embodied by the 
likes o f O, those who support "peoples of co lour" insult the latter 
a second time: this time peoples of colour are not being colo-
nized territorially and ideologically; rather they are uniformly 
branded as the "virtuous other" regardless o f their own class, 
gender, race, and other differences, and are thus, to cite Edward 
Said, Oriental ized all over again. To put all this in blunter terms, 
we can draw an analogy between what is happening to O and the 
much-criticized white fantasy about the "sexuality" of, say, black 
people. Accord ing to this fantasy, the black man or woman 
simply ¿5 sex, primitive rhythm, unrepressed nature, and so forth. 
To this wish list we may now add "the oppressed," "revolution," 
and "polit ical correctness" as we l l . 1 9 
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The machines of surveillance here are not war airplanes but 
the med ia—the networks of communicat ion, which, in the aca-
demic world, include the classroom, conferences, publications, 
funding agencies, and even letters of recommendation. With the 
large number of students (rightíy) eager for alternative histories, 
of academic conferences (rightly) devoted to the constructions 
of differences, and of publishers (rightly) seeking to publish 
new, unexplored materials, fascism has reasserted itself in our 
era. A n d , as even my brief discussion shows, fascism's new mode 
is very much complicated by postcoloniality. The question facing 
intellectuals i n the contemporary West is how to deal with peo-
ples who were once colonized and who are now l iving and 
working in the "first wor ld " as "others." 2 0 In the early days of 
colonialism, when actual territorial conquests were made and 
relocation from the "mother country" to the colonies was a fact of 
life for those from what eventually came to be called the "first 
wor ld, " the questions for white people finding themselves re-
moved from home were questions of what Nancy Armstrong and 
Leonard Tennenhouse call "the imaginary puritan": how to pre-
serve whiteness while i n the brown and black colonies? How to 
stay Engl ish in America? How to fabricate a respectable national 
or ig in against the onslaught of barbaric natives—that is, how to 
posture as the invaded and colonized while invading and coloniz-
ing others? A l l in all , these questions amount to: How not to "go 
native"? 2 1 As Armstrong and Tennenhouse argue, the Engl ish 
novel, which was conceptually based not so much on previous 
cultural developments in Europe but rather on the captivity 
narratives that found their way back to Europe from the "New 
World, " bears symptoms of this white anxiety about cultural 
purity. In this sense, the Engl ish novel is perhaps the earliest 
example—to use Fredric Jameson's classic pronouncement on 
"third wor ld " l i terature—of a "national allegory." 
Toward the end of the twentieth century, as the aftermath of 
the grand imperialist eras brings about major physical migra-
tions of populations around the globe, it is no longer a question 
of white people going to the colonies, but rather of formerly 
colonized peoples setding permanendy in their former colo-
nizers' territories. The visible presence of these formerly colo-
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nized peoples in the "first wor ld" leads to violent upheavals in 
"Western thought." The overriding preoccupation among first 
world intellectuals has now become: how to become "other"? 
How to claim to be a minor i ty—to claim to be black, Native 
American, Hispanic, or Asian, even if one has only i/64th share 
of these "other" origins? In other words, how to "go native"} 
Instead of imagining themselves to be a Pamela or Clarissa held 
captive, resisting rape, and writing volumes in order to preserve 
the purity of their souls (and thus their "origins," to quote again 
from Armstrong and Tennenhouse), first world intellectuals are 
now overtaken by a new k ind of desire: "Make me other! " A n d so, 
with expediency, we witness the publication of essays which are 
studded with names of nations and territories in order to convey 
a profile of "cosmopolitanism"; journals which amass the most 
superficial materials about lesser known cultures and ethnicities 
in the name of being "publ ic , " "global," or "transnational"; and 
book series which (en)list " indigenous" histories and narratives 
in the manner of a world f a i r—a l l this, while so-called "post-
co lonia l " criticisms of former European imperialist strategies of 
representing, objectifying, and exhibit ing "the other" are going 
on. 
If there is one thing that unites the early territorial colonialism 
and the contemporary white liberalist intellectual trends that I 
am describing, it is the not ion of a clear demarcation between 
"self' and "other," between "us" and " them"—a demarcation that 
is mediated through the relations between consciousness and 
captivity. The myth, i n the days of territorial colonialism, was that 
(white) consciousness had to be established in resistance to 
captivity—even while whites were hold ing other peoples and 
lands captive—so that (white) cultural origins could be kept 
pure. In the postcolonial era, by contrast, the myth is that (white) 
consciousness must itself "surrender to" or be "held captive by" 
the other—that (white) consciousness is nothing without this 
captivity called "otherness." In both cases, however, what remains 
constant is the belief that "we" are not "them, " and that "white" is not 
"other. " This belief, which can be further encapsulated as "we are 
not other," is fascism par excellence. 
Emerging in postcoloniality, the new "desire for our others" 
displays the same positive, projectional symptoms of fascism that 
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I discussed in the preceding pages—a rebelliousness and a 
monstrous aesthetics, but most of all a longing for a transparent, 
idealized image and an identifying submission to such an image. 
Like the masses' embrace of a H ider or a Mussol ini , this fascism 
seeks empowerment through a surrender to the other as film— 
as the film that overcomes me in the spell of an unmediated 
"experience." The indiscriminate embrace of the peoples of col-
our as "correct" regardless o f their differences and histories is 
ultimately the desire for a pure-otherness-in-pristine-luminosity 
that is as dangerous as the fascism of hateful discrimination from 
which we all suppose we are safely distanced. The genealogical 
affinity of these two fascisms is perhaps best exemplif ied by the 
art of a Len i Riefenstahl, who progressed from embracing Nazi 
racism to embracing the beautiful Nuba men of the southern 
Sudan. 
If the controversial label "fascism" is indeed useful, as I think it 
is, for a radical critique o f the contemporary intellectual culture 
in the West, it is because it helps us identify and problematize the 
good conscience and noble obligations of the new liberal fascism 
with its multiculturalist modes and its sophisticated enterprises 
of visibility. Some wil l no doubt want to disavow such ongoing 
fascist longings in our midst; others, hopefully, wil l not . 2 2 
NOTES 
1 For an informative analysis of some of the well-known and/or widely adopted 
interpretations of fascism in Germany, see Schulte-Sasse. For some of the more 
recent discussions of fascism in Europe and European writers, see the essays in 
Golsan. This volume also contains a useful "Selective Bibliography" of recent 
works in English on fascism. 
2 The argument that ideology is the history that has been "naturalized" or "dis-
guised" is a predominant way of understanding fascism; accordingly, fascism is 
construed as a matter of lies. As will become clear in the course of this essay, my 
argument differs from this major view of ideology in that I do not see fascism 
simply as lying. 
3 It is well-known that even today members of the Japanese Parliament attempt to 
deny their country's war atrocities. "Magee's Testament" shows one such MP, 
Shintaro Ishihara, declaring in an interview with Playboy that the atrocities did not 
happen and then changing his mind in a subsequent interview with Time. In the 
second interview, Ishihara proclaimed that merely 20,000, rather than 300,000, 
Chinese were killed in the Nanjing Massacre—as if a smaller number would make 
the massacre of less concern. This denial is so determined that the Japanese 
government ensured that Emperor Akihito's visit to China in 1992 would not be 
used as the occasion for an apology. There was an unfortunate period in which 
my country inflicted great sufferings on the people of China," Akihito said, 
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speaking in Japanese. "I feel deep sorrow about this." Meanwhile, the Japanese 
Education Ministry exercised its constitutional right to dictate the contents of 
schoolbooks by censoring descriptions of the Japanese army's germ warfare 
experiments on prisoners and of episodes such as the Rape of Nanjing. According 
to a Reuters report in March 1993, Japan's Supreme Court upheld this censor-
ship and rejected the lawsuit by Saburo Ienaga, a retired history professor, who 
had waged a 30-year batde against the whitewashing of wartime history ("Japa-
nese Court OKs Censoring of Schoolbooks"). Ienaga finally won his batde in May 
igg4 ("Scholar Wins Ruling on Nanjing Massacre"). As Claude Lanzman writes in 
Shoah: An Oral History of the Holocaust, for the invention of genocide no one wants 
"copyright." Lanzman is quoted by Michael Lestz in a review essay on holocaust 
literature, "Lishi de mingji." For discussions of Japanese war atrocities in China 
published in Chinese, see for instance Xu Zhigeng and Gao Xingzu. For a recent 
overview of Sino-Japanese political and cultural relations since the Second World 
War, see Dirlik. 
4 'The subject attributes tendencies, desires, etc., to others that he refuses to 
recognize in himself: the racist, for instance, projects his own faults and un-
acknowledged inclinations on to the group he reviles. This type of projection . . . 
seems to come closest to the Freudian sense of the term" (Laplanche and 
Pontalis, 351. See also the entire entry under "Projection," 349-56). 
5 For instance, in an essay on the 1932 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution in 
Rome, Schnapp describes "the structural undergirding of fascist ideology" as a 
"taut but hollow frame over which a canvas must be stretched in order for the 
illusion of fullness to spring forth." Fascism "required an aesthetic overproduction 
—a surfeit of fascist signs, images, slogans, books, and buildings—to compensate 
for, fill in, and cover up its forever unstable ideological core" (3; emphasis in the 
original). As I go on to argue in this essay, the twin components of lack and 
compensation are crucial to Freud's concept of projection. 
6 Memmi associates fascism with colonialism: "every colonial nation carries the 
seeds of fascist temptation in its bosom. . . . What is fascism, if not a regime of 
oppression for the benefit of a few? .. .colonialism is one variety of fascism" (62). 
Reich associates fascism with authoritarianism and mysticism; Laclau analyzes 
fascism as a kind of populism or failed socialism; Kaplan studies fascism from the 
point of view of the banal and the everyday. 
7 Quoting from Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals, Deleuze and Guattari write: 
"In the latency system of terror, what is no longer active, en-acted, or reacted to, 
'this instinct for freedom forcibly made latent . . . pushed back and repressed, 
incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and vent itself only on itself,' — 
that very thing is now ressenti. . ." (214; emphases in the original). 
8 By reading novels, autobiographies, and letters of the Freikorps officers, as well as 
illustrating his readings ironically with cartoons, posters, advertisements, and 
other graphic materials, Theweleit's work on fascism shares with Kaplan's a 
methodological focus on the obvious and everyday as the place to look for fascist 
aesthetics. 
9 Elsaesser emhasizes throughout his essay the historicity of fascism and the histori-
city of film theory's privileged ability to explain processes of specularization. 
1 0 Having said this, I should add, however, that the imagistic or projectional implica-
tions of fascism go well beyond the medium of film itself. 
1 1 In the passage from which my tide is taken, Sontag writes: 
Riefenstahl's current de-Nazification and vindication as indomitable priestess 
of the beautiful—as a film maker and now, as a photographer—do not augur 
well for the keenness of current abilities to detect the fascist longings in our 
midst. The force of her work is precisely in the continuity of its political and 
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aesthetic ideas. What is interesting is that this was once seen so much more 
clearly than it seems to be now. (43) 
Sontag's argument here is comparable to that of Bataille, who describes fascist 
authority in terms of a "double character" in which "cruel tendencies" co-exist 
with "the need, characteristic of all domination, to realize and idealize order" 
(146). 
Unlike orthodox Marxism, which reduces spiritual and artistic phenomena to 
economics, the fascism of the 1920s and 1930s had a great appeal to artists and 
intellectuals because it gave the potentially creative role of beliefs—of myth-
making—a central place in social life. This was especially so in the case of Italian 
fascism, which was, unlike German fascism, aesthetically compatible with the 
avant garde tenets of modernism. For an informative argument, see Dasenbrock. 
See Kaplan's very interesting discussion of the "slogan text" in chapter 3 of 
her book. For Kaplan, the slogan is a form of encapsulation with the performa-
tive aura of the "self-evident," luminous, transparent speech act, which appeals 
through the clarity of refrain rather than through thought and discourse. Both 
visual and audial in effect, slogans are brief strings of words that tell and make 
history at the same time, and "a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy" (68). 
For a similar critique of the positivistic manner in which some non-white feminists 
tum to "lived experience" as "an alternative mode of radical subjectivity," see 
Suleri, "Woman Skin Deep." 
This environment can in part be described in terms of what Bové calls "the facile 
professionalization of the U.S. academy" (xv). However, the ramifications in-
volved go far beyond the U.S. academy. 
I want to emphasize once again that my point is not to defend Western imperial-
ism or Eurocentrism per se, but rather to mobilize criticism of the trends of 
uninformed and unanalytical claims about "cultural pluralism" that are being 
made in the name of anti-imperialism and anti-Eurocentrism. By implication, it is 
also to criticize those who are kind and lenient whenever it comes to dealing with 
non-Westem scholars—those, in other words, who base their judgements on the 
sole basis of skin colour. 
The situation here is comparable, though not identical, to Zizek's analysis of the 
popular support for Kurt Waldheim in the 1986 Austrian presidential campaign. 
The Austrian people, to put the matter in the form of ajoke of the time, wanted to 
have "Waldheimer's Disease," the disease of not being able to remember that one 
has been a Nazi, but this is precisely what Waldheim's opponents missed. As Zizek 
writes: 
Starting from the assumption that Waldheim was attracting voters because of 
his great-statesman image, leftists put the emphasis of their campaign on 
proving to the public that not only is Waldheim a man with a dubious past 
(probably involved in war crimes) but also a man who is not prepared to 
confront his past, a man who evades crucial questions concerning it—in short, 
a man whose basic feature is a refusal to "work through" the traumatic past. 
What they overlooked was that it was precisely this feature with which the 
majority of centrist voters identified. Post-war Austria is a country whose very 
existence is based on a refusal to "work through" its Nazi past—proving that 
Waldheim was evading confrontation with his past emphasized the exact trait-
of-identification of the majority of voters. 
The theoretical lesson to be learned from the campaign, Zizek continues, "is that 
the trait-of-identification can also be a certain failure, weakness, guilt of the other, 
so that by pointing out the failure we can unwittingly reinforce the identification" 
( 105-06). Zizek's book is entirely relevant to the critique of idealism in fascist and 
totalitarian operations. See my discussion in "Ethics after Idealism." 
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1 9 Spivak refers to the current constructions of the "third world" and "marginality" 
in the academy as a "new orientalism" (56). See also Suleri's critique of what she 
calls "alteritism," which is characterized by an indiscriminate reliance on the 
centrality of otherness and tends to replicate the familiar category of the exotic in 
imperialist discourse: "alteritism enters the interpretive scene to insist on the 
conceptual centrality of an untouchable intransigence. Much like the category of 
the exotic in the colonial narratives of the prior century, contemporary critical 
theory names the other in order that it need not be further known" ( The Rhetoric of 
English India 13). 
For a discussion of this epochal change from the viewpoint of die "others," see 
Chow, "Against the Lures of Diaspora." 
Among other things, Armstrong's and Tennenhouse's The Imaginary Puritan is a 
significant contribution to the vast project of deconstructing and thus provin-
cializing Western European culture, in particular that of England. 
2 2 Many people must be acknowledged for having contributed to the final shape of 
this essay. Nancy Armstrong, Chris Cullens, Prabhakara Jha, Kwai-cheung Lo, 
Austin Meredith, and Dorothea von Mücke were readers who responded with 
constructive comments to the first draft when it was completed in December 
190,2. Members of the Critical Theory Institute at the University of California, 
Irvine devoted a session to a subsequent version of the essay in Fall 1993, and I 
thank in particular Lindon Barrett, Alexander Gelley, and John Rowe for their 
extended remarks. I am also grateful to Iain Chambers, Chris Connery, Hal 
Foster, and Kathleen Woodward for their assistance at various stages. To Livia 
Monnet, who gave me her indefatigable enthusiasm and support, I owe a special 
debt of friendship. 
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